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TOOLS FOR UNDERSTANDING: PROBLEMS




The term "legislative intent" is itself an oxymoron.1 A collec-
tive legislative intent cannot exist in the minds of national legis-
lators in Congress.2 If Congress' collective intent could be deter-
mined readily, the relevance of legislative history would be
obvious and its use would engender little controversy. "The real
difficulty is not that the intent is irrelevant but that the intent is
* J.D., 1998 Fordham University School of Law. B.A., 1993 Tufts
University. Legislative Assistant to U.S. Congressman Gary L. Ackerman
(NY), 1993-1995. The author wishes to thank his family and his wife Mi-
chele, for their tolerance and support.
1. "An oxymoron is a two-word contradiction. The claim of this
brief paper is that legislative intent, along with military intelligence,
jumbo shrimp, and student athlete, belongs in this category." Kenneth
A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They," Not An "It". Legislative Intent As Oxymo-
ron, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992).
2. "[T]he legislature, being a composite body, cannot have a sin-
gle state of mind and so cannot have a single intention." Douglas
Payne, The Intention of The Legislature In The Interpretation Of Statutes, 9
CuRRENT LEGAL PROBS. 96, 97-98 (1956). "A legislature certainly has no
intention whatever in connection with words which some two or three
men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to
which many of the approving majority might have had, and often de-
monstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs." Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870 (1930).
That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any
real sense is almost an immediate inference from a statement
of the proposition. The chances that of several hundred men
each will have exactly the same determinate situations in
mind as possible reductions of a given determinable are in-
finitesimally small. The chance is still smaller that a given de-
terminate, the litigated issue, will not only be within the
minds of all these men but will be certain to be selected by
all of them as the present limit to which the determinable
should be narrowed.
Id. at 870.
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often undiscoverable, especially when the passer of statutes is...
a representative assembly."3
Nonetheless, at present, United States Federal Courts often
utilize legislative history to decipher the intent of Congress.4
Judges' attraction to legislative history is understandable; it may
often assist in explaining the intended interpretation of statutory
text.5 However, as judicial attention to legislative history has in-
creased, so has the amount of legislative history of marginal
worth.'
The problem is that courts often lack the tools to make this
value determination. Consequently, the use of legislative history
has become the subject of considerable controversy in all three
branches of the federal government.7 Much of the literature on
statutory interpretation "seems transfixed by the notion of treat-
3. James M. Landis, A Note On "Statutory Interpretation", 43 HARv. L.
REv. 886, 888 (1930).
4. See W. David Slawson, Legislative History And The Need To Bring
Statutory Interpretation Under The Rule Of Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383, 383
(1992). Judge Charles E. Wiggins advises to the contrary that "[c] ourts
seldom rely upon an attempt to garner the intention of Congress in
adopting legislation. Their reluctance to overlook such research is as a
consequence of its futility. Seldom will courts delve into this murky
area unless their conclusions are otherwise supported in the record."
Letter from Judge Charles E. Wiggins, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Ap-
peals Ninth Circuit (Mar. 18, 1997) (on file with author). Judge Wig-
gins has served in his present position since 1984. His insight is of spe-
cial value because he also served as a Member of Congress from 1967
to 1979.
5. See Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative
History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1125 (1983) [hereinafter Dickerson,
Dipping Into Legislative History]. "Using legislative history to help inter-
pret unclear statutory language seems natural. Legislative history helps
a court understand the context and purpose of a statute." Steven
Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL.
L. REv. 845, 848 (1993).
6. See Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool Of Construction Or De-
struction, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 43, 44 (1988).
7. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 131, 132 (4th Ed.
1992); see also Office of Legal Pol'y, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Using and Misusing
Legislative History: A Re-Evaluation of the Status of Legislative History in Stat-
utory Interpretation ii (1989) [hereinafter USING AND MISUSING LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY].
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ing legislatures holistically, even when fallacy and sloppy thinking
are pointed out."'8 This literature "is rich in references to the 'in-
tent' or 'purpose' of the legislature, terms suggesting that a legis-
lature may have subjective attitudes and drives such as those pos-
sessed by a human being."9 "[I]t is unrealistic to talk about
legislative intent because the notion of 'the law maker' is fic-
tional; there is no such person."' 0 Making legislation "is a group
activity and it is impossible to conceive a group mind or
cerebration.""I
"Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some
vague social or economic evil; however, because its Members may
differ sharply on the means for effectuating that intent, the final
language of the legislation may reflect hard fought com-
promises." 12 "Invocation of the 'plain purpose' of legislation at
the expense of the terms of the statute itself takes no account of
the processes of compromise and, in the end, prevents effectua-
8. Shepsle, supra note 1, at 249.
9. Id. at 249 (quoting Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: A
Peek into the Mind and Will of a Legislature, 50 INDIANA L.J. 206, 206
(1975) [hereinafter Dickerson, A Peek into the Mind].
10. Shepsle, supra note 1, at 249 (quoting Dickerson, A Peek into the
Mind, supra note 9, at 207).
11. Gerald C. MacCallum Jr., Legislative Intent, 75 YALE LJ. 754, 764
(1966) (quoting ALBERT KOCOUREK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE
OF LAw 201 (1982)). "A composite body can hardly have a single in-
tent." Id. at 764 (quoting John Willis, Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell,
16 CAN. BAR. REv. 1, 3 (1938)). "[T] he legislature, being a composite
body, cannot have a single state of mind and so cannot have a single
intention." Id. at 764 (quoting Payne, supra note 2, at 97-98). Neverthe-
less, "despite occasional protestations to the contrary, the typical lawyer
or judge continues to refer to legislative intent, even though it remains
a matter of inference and conjecture[.]" Shepsle, supra note 1, at 249
(quoting Dickerson, A Peek into the Mind, supra note 9, at 207, 216.)
12. American Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1185 n.10 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (quoting Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimen-
sion Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986)). "[S]ometimes statutes
are unclear as a result of legislative compromises that are struck to se-
cure votes for the enactment of a statute. Compromises can be struck
by an agreement to leave undefined a general word or phrase in order
to protect a particular political position." ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE,
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 769 (1995).
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tion of congressional intent."13 Thus, use of "[1]egislative intent
is an internally inconsistent, self-contradictory expression", 14 be-
cause it erroneously presumes that viewing the pieces selectively
can fairly represent the whole puzzle.
Additionally, "[o]ver the last twenty to twenty-five years, there
has been a change in the style of statute drafting .... Our envi-
ronmental statutes have become very much more detailed."'5 As
Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
commented, "[n] o one who has read the environmental laws can
avoid concluding that there is excess specificity designed to tie
the hands of actors who might pull a switch."' 6 Ironically, it is
this very specificity that has triggered the need to resolve
ambiguity.
The examination in this Note is necessary due to a lack of
literature with regard to Congress' interpretation of environmen-
tal statutes. Most literature in the area of environmental law fo-
cuses on agency interpretation. While the Supreme Court has
spoken definitively on the issue of agency interpretation,'" no
overarching federal procedure exists governing the use of Con-
gress' interpretations of the very legislation that it enacts.
"Concern with environmental issues in recent decades has gen-
erated a bevy of environmental statutes whose complexity and in-
terrelationship have in turn generated a host of problems for ad-
ministrators, courts and scholars."'" These problems have
13. American Mining Cong., 824 F.2d at 1185 n.10 (quoting Dimen-
sion Financial Corp., 474 U.S. at 374).
14. Shepsle, supra note 1, at 239.
15. Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Statutory Interpretation in
China and The United States, 5 N.YU. ENVTL. L.J 556, 558 (1996).
16. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History and Structure in Statutory In-
terpretation, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 63 (1994).
17. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). See generally
Simona Papazian, Comment, Sweet Home 's Effect On The Chevron Doc-
trine And The Increased Role Of The Judiciary In Reviewing Agency Statutory
Interpretations, 7 FoaDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 543 (1996).
18. David L. Shapiro, Statutory Dilemmas In The Regulation Of The
Environment, 5 N.YU. ENVL. LJ. 292, 292 (1996).
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afforded courts the. opportunity to look to legislative history in
their quest to understand environmental statutes.
Proving that legislative history has been clearly misused in any
judicial opinion would be an impossible task. If no collective in-
tent exists, then one cannot show that any document did not re-
flect that lack of intent. Insofar as legislative history may be re-
lied upon as an interpretive tool, however, this Note demonsrates
that its reliability is uncertain at best, and that courts should turn
to it only as a last resort.
In analyzing the interpretation of environmental law, this Note
provides examples where courts did look to legislative history as
an interpretive aid. This Note examines three types of congres-
'sional legislative history. Part I addresses Committee Reports;
Part II addresses House of Representatives Floor Statements; and
Part III addresses Conference Committee Reports. The discus-
sion focuses on both the practical aspects of the creation of legis-
lative history, the troubling consequences of its use, and possible
alternative methods for the court to use when interpreting the
statutes, without resorting to legislative history.
I. COMMITTEE REPORTS
The Supreme Court regards committee reports as the most re-
liable and persuasive type of legislative history.19 The practical at-
traction of these documents is their use of plain language to ana-
lyze a bill section by section. The details and guidance contained
in this analysis often addresses matters subsidiary to the text.20
These materials would be included in the text of the legislation
if they were not subordinate to the enacted text.
Many judges also believe that Committee Reports represent
the "considered and collective understanding" of the legislators
who were involved in drafting the proposed legislation. 21 Reports
19. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 n.7 (1986) ("We have
repeatedly recognized that the authoritative source for legislative intent
lies in the Committee Reports on the bill").
20. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary On Judicial Inter-
pretations Of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1,
29-30 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969). See also Gar-
cia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984). Even the skeptical Judge
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"tend to emphasize the main thrusts of the legislation, which are
usually not too hard to infer from general context." 22
In fact, Members of Congress are often more familiar with the
information in Committee Reports than the legislative language
itself.23 Senator Arlen Specter reasons that the "prose of a report
is easier to understand, and because a bill usually amends an ex-
isting statute, it is impossible to follow without referring to the
U.S. Code." 24 Others also look to Committee Reports for voting
cues and rely on the information they provide. James L. Buckley,
a former Senator and D.C. Circuit Judge, has commented, " [M]y
understanding of most of the legislation I voted on was based en-
tirely on my reading of its language and, where necessary, on ex-
planations contained in the accompanying report."25
In Congress, deliberation occurs primarily at the committee
and subcommittee levels. 26 There, the formative process of de-
bate and drafting takes place. Both committees and subcommit-
tees conduct hearings where legislators gain insight from expert
testimony. Legislators make compromises with other committee
members to gain support. This section uses FIFRA to address
both the judicial use of Committee Reports and the process of
Mikva is convinced, explaining that a committee report is "the bone
structure of the legislation. It is the road map that explains why things
are out of the statute." Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28
TEX. L. REv. 181, 184 (1986).
22. Dickerson, Dipping Into Legislative History, supra note 5, at 1131-
32.
23. ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 140 (1973).
24. Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes A Narrow View in Seeking Congress'
Will, 48 CONG. Q. 913, 917 (1990).
25. Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing
before Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of
Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 21 (1990).
26.
[T]he intent of Congress is largely produced by a few mem-
bers of the legislative committees. The general membership
ordinarily does not participate in debate in which they are
not personally interested. It would be difficult therefore to
ascribe an intent to Congress based upon the random com-
ments of a few members.
Letter from Judge Wiggins, supra note 4, at 1.
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their creation, which makes this use risky, and consequently
undesirable.
A. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
1. The Use Of Committee Reports To Interpret FIFRA
Congress enacted the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Ro-
denticide Act (FIFRA) 27 to regulate the use of pesticides. In Wis-
consin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,28 the Supreme Court ruled that
a local ordinance regulating the use of pesticides was not pre-
empted by FIFRA. In this decision the Court examined, but did
not resolve, the issue of what role a statute's legislative history
should play in a court's interpretation. The Court found that
FIFRA contained no clear pre-emptive intent, and that its legisla-
tive history was ambiguous. 29 The Court's use of legislative history
in Mortier provides insight into some of the troublesome aspects
of Committee Reports.
The ambiguity at issue in Mortier concerned the statute's defi-
nition of the word "State." 30 Because FIFRA nowhere referred to
political subdivisions, the Court's analysis was needed to review
FIFRA's impact on the ability of local governments to regulate
the use of pesticides. To determine whether Congress intended
to preclude political subdivisions from exercising any regulatory
authority under FIFRA, the Court turned to the legislative history
of the statute.
When initially proposed in the House, FIFRA contained a sec-
tion providing that "nothing in this Act shall be construed as
limiting the authority of a State or political subdivision thereof
27. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1990). For a more detailed discussion,
see Timothy A. Quarberg, Note, Getting The Bugs Out: The Role of Legis-
lative History In Determining The Pre-Emptive Effect of FIFRA Upon Local Reg-
ulation Of Pesticides In Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct.
2476 (1991), 15 HAMLINE L. REv. 223 (1991).
28. 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
29. See id. at 616 (Scalia, J. concurring).
30. FIFRA defines a "state" as "a state, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, and American Somoa." 7 U.S.C.
§ 136v(a) (1990).
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to regulate the sale or use of a pesticide within its jurisdiction."3
The House Agriculture Committee deleted the reference to po-
litical subdivisions "on the grounds that the 50 States and the
Federal Government should provide an adequate number of reg-
ulatory jurisdictions. " 32 In its report, the Senate Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry agreed with the House Committee and
stated that:
it is the intent that Section 24,33 by not providing any authority
to political subdivisions and other local authorities of or in the
States, should be understood as depriving such local authorities
and political subdivisions of any and all jurisdiction and author-
ity over pesticides and the regulation of pesticides. 34
The Senate Commerce Committee offered an amendment au-
thorizing local regulation, but subsequently withdrew it after con-
ferring with the Agriculture and Forestry Committee. 35 Together,
the two committees offered a compromise measure, which did
not include a provision concerning local regulation.3 6 The con-
ference committee failed to address the issue of local regulation
because both versions lacked any provision on the matter.37
Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that local authority
to regulate pesticides was not pre-empted. 8 Before the issue
reached the Supreme Court, some courts had found the legisla-
tive history clear, 39 while others had found it ambiguous. 40 In-
stead of clarifying the weight to be given to the legislative his-
tory, the Supreme Court simply dismissed the history as "at best
31. Maryland Pest Control Ass'n v. Montgomery County, 646 F.
Supp. 109, 111-12 (D. Md. 1986).
32. Id. at 113.
33. 7 U.S.C. § 136v.
34. S. REP. No. 92-838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 4008, quoted in Maryland Pest Control, 646 F. Supp. at
112.
35. See Quarberg, supra note 27, at 229.
36. See Maryland Pest Control, 646 F. Supp. at 113.
37. Id. at 113.
38. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
39. See, e.g., Mortier, 501 U.S. at 617 (Scalia, J., concurring); Profes-
sional Lawn Care Ass'n v. Village of Milford, 909 F2d 929, 935 (6th Cir.
1990) (Nelson, J., concurring); Maryland Pest Control, 646 F Supp. at
113.
40. See, e.g., Mortier, 501 U.S. at 611-12; People ex rel. Deukmejian v.
County of Mendocino, 683 P.2d 1150, 1160-61 (Cal. 1984).
[Vol. IX
1997] LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 189
ambiguous."'41 In response to a footnote in Justice Scalia's con-
currence the Court offered some guidance: "[T]he meaning a
committee puts forward must at a minimum be within the realm
of meanings that the provision, fairly read, could bear. ' 42 The
Court observed that Congress cannot "take language that could
only cover 'flies' or 'mosquitoes,' and tell the court that it really
covers 'ducks.' 43
A "clear and manifest purpose" to pre-empt state law may be
(1) expressed explicitly in the statute; (2) implied by the com-
prehensive nature of the statute; or (3) caused by actual conflict
between state and federal law.44 Here, the Court's problem was
not with (1) or (3), but with (2). Pre-emption by implication oc-
curs when federal legislation occupies an entire field of regula-
tion, leaving no room for states to supplement federal law.45 Be-
cause courts have allowed the "clear and manifest purpose" of
Congress to be inferred from legislation, many pre-emption cases
deal with ambiguous statutes where Congress has expressed no
clear pre-emptive intent. In Mortier, the Court decided to turn to
the Committee Report to clarify the ambiguity with regard to the
definition of "State". This decision is problematic and unneces-
sary. The Court unnecessarily complicated its analysis of the stat-
ute by using -albeit rejecting -un-enacted text in order to inter-
pret relatively unambiguous legislative language.
Alternatively, the Court could have clarified the ambiguity sim-
ply by turning to the United States Code. When Congress has
sought to include reference to political subdivisions, it has often
done so explicitly. A statute dealing with pipeline safety defines a
municipality as a political subdivision of a State.46 In the Air Pol-
lution Prevention and Control Act, the definition section in-
cludes the following:
(13) The term "municipality" (A) means a city, town, borough,
county, parish, district, or other public body created pursuant
to State law, with responsibility for the planning or administra-
tion of solid waste management, or an Indian tribe or author-
ized tribal organization or Alaska Native village or organization,
41. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 609.
42. Id. at 611 n.4.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Mortier, 501 U.S. at 604-05; Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986).
45. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 368.
46. See 49 U.S.C. § 60,101(a) (1) (B) (15) (1994).
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and (B) includes any rural community or unincorporated town
or village or any other public entity for which an application
for assistance is made by a State or political subdivision
thereof 7
Both statutes contain definitions of the term "State" that are
similar to FIFRA.48 It is clearly Congressional practice to include
specific reference to political subdivisions when the body intends
it to be included in a regulation. Here Congress did not enact
such language, and the inquiry should have ended with an exam-
ination of statutorily-enacted language.
While the Court's legal decision here was significant, in terms
of its environmental impact, the process that the justices used in
arriving at their holding is cause for concern. Legislation can
only cover topics that are addressed directly in the enacted text.
The bounds of legislative text can only be expanded by legisla-
tive enactments. Clearly, the Court did not have to resort to the
Committee Reports in determining the meaning of FIFRA.
2. Additional Considerations
In dealing with the specific wording in Mortier, the Court did
not address the fact that Committee Reports are not written by
the legislators themselves, but by members of their staffs. 49 Addi-
tionally, there are many cases where Members do not read the
Committee Report or have only a superficial familiarity with
their contents.5 0 As a result, Committee Reports "often fall in the
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7602 (1994).
48. " 'State' means a State of the United States, the District of Co-
lumbia, and Puerto Rico." 49 U.S.C. § 60,101(a)(1)(B)(20) (1994).
"The term 'State' means any of the several States, the District of Co-
lumbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam,
American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Is-
lands." 42 U.S.C. § 7602 (1994).
49. It is common knowledge on Capitol Hill that legislators tend
to negotiate the broader aspects of legislation, while the staff is left to
draft and explain it. See Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of
Legislative History, 1987 DuKE LJ. 371, 375 (1987) ("Even in the setting
of the congressional committee, in many cases the report adopted will
likely not even have been reviewed, much less written or studied, by all
members.").50. See id. at 375; see also Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490
U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I find no reason to be-
[Vol. IX
1997] LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 191
'unreliable' category.""1 Judges should assume that they were
probably "not read by, let alone written by, an elected official
unless they are referred to or quoted in debate." 52 Accordingly,
Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, warns, "these staff reports are often a portion of the legisla-
tive history that is only tangentially related to the actual legisla-
tive process. Courts ought to accord such reports very little, if
any, significance. '' 53
In Mortier, the Court failed to reflect on the minimal involve-
ment of legislators in the process of drafting report language, an
area where legislators place heavy responsibility on their staffs.
Because the courts rely so heavily on reports, some scholars ar-
gue that there may be incentive for staffers to load these
sources.5 4 "Thus, legislative history can be abused in the creation
stage as well as in the interpretive stage. ' 55 The abuse of legisla-
tive history in the creation stage occurs when unelected staff
members 'cook up' some language for a committee report or a
speech on the Senate floor with an eye to influencing uninitiated
or outcome-oriented judges."5 6
Perhaps an overzealous staff member, or one susceptible to in-
terest group influence, may include information in the Commit-
tee Report that contradicts the statutory language. If a judge
lieve that any more than a handful of the Members of Congress .. .[if
any] voted .. .on the basis of the referenced statements in the Sub-
committee, Committee, or Conference Committee Reports, or floor de-
bates."); Hirschey v FERC, 777 F.2d at 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("I frankly doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume that
the details, as opposed to the broad outlines of purposes, set forth in a
committee report come to the attention of, much less are approved by,
the house which enacts the committee's bill.").
51. Hatch, supra note 6, at 45.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. "[The] routine deference to the detail of Committee Reports,
and the predictable expansion in that detail which routine deference
has produced, are converting a system of judicial construction into a
system of committee-staff prescription." Hirschey, 777 F.2d at 8 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
55. Hatch, supra note 6, at 44.
56. Id.
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later relies on this report language it could effectively change the
meaning of the enacted statute.5 7 Justice Scalia asserts that it
must be "a heady feeling . . . for a young staffer, to know that
his or her citation of obscure district court cases can transform
them into the law of the land, thereafter dutifully to be observed
by the Supreme Court itself."58
It is possible the legislators voting on FIFRA did not read the
Committee Reports at all. In fact, a legislator is more likely to
read a one-page summary written by the bill's sponsor in the
form of a "Dear Colleague" letter,59 or a summary prepared by
the Republican Study Conference or the Democratic Study
Group.60 In Mortier, the Court had no way of knowing how indi-
vidual Members of Congress got their information about FIFRA.
A general familiarity with the Committee Report cannot be
assumed.
B. The Endangered Species Act (ESA)
1. The Use of Committee Reports
Problems also arise where an Appropriations Subcommittee,
who did not draft the legislation originally, attempts to reinter-
pret legislation through a subsequent Committee Report. In Ten-
nessee Valley Authority v. Hill,61 the Supreme Court needed to de-
57. See American Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1192 n.22
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Hirschey, 777 F.2d at 7-8.
58. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part).
59. "Dear Colleague" letters are often sent by the sponsor of a bill
to all other Members of Congress. They usually contain a one or two
page summary of what the sponsor intends the bill to do. These letters
are relied on heavily by staffers as well.
60. The Republican Study Conference and Democratic Study
Group were previously Legislative Service Organizations (LSOs) within
the House of Representatives. As part of its reform package at the start
of the 104th Congress, the Republican majority eliminated funding for
LSOs. As a result, the Republicans absorbed their organization into the
office of the Speaker of the House, whose office currently produces the
reports. The Democrats, lacking similar financial resources, tried to
found an external organization which was soon taken over by Congres-
sional Quarterly Magazine, which now produces the reports.
61. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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termine whether the Endangered Species Act required a court
order to enjoin the operation of the Tellico Dam and Reservoir
Project, which was virtually complete. This predicament arose be-
cause the Secretary of the Interior had determined that opera-
tion of the dam would eradicate endangered species. 62 Addition-
ally, the Court needed to determine whether the continued
Congressional appropriations for the Tellico Dam after the ad-
vent of the ESA constituted an implied repeal of the ESA with
regard to this particular project.63
Construction on the Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project began
in 1967. 64 In 1973, the snail darter, a previously unknown species
of perch, was discovered in the waters of the Little Tennessee
River.65 It was possible that any alteration of the snail darter's
habitat could endanger the survival of the species. Four months
later, Congress passed the ESA.66 The legislation authorizes the
Secretary to declare species of animal life to be "endangered"
and to identify their "critical habitat".67 In 1975, the Secretary of-
ficially listed the snail darter as an endangered species. 68 Since
the Little Tennessee River was the "critical habitat" of the Snail
62. See id.
63. See id. at 156.
64. See id. at 157.
65. See id. at 167.
66. See id. at 159.
67.
The Secretary [of the Interior] shall review other programs
administered by him and utilize such programs in further-
ance of the purposes of this chapter. All other Federal de-
partments and agencies shall, in consultation with and with
the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in fur-
therance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out pro-
grams for the conservation of endangered species and
threatened species pursuant to section 1533 of this title and
by taking such action necessary to insure [sic] that actions
authorized, funds or carries out by them do not jeopardize
the continued existence of such endangered species and
threatened species or result in the destruction of modifica-
tion of habitat of such species which is determined by the
Secretary, to be critical.
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
68. See Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 161.
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Darter, the Secretary declared that the completion or operation
of the Tellico Dam should be halted.69
However, in 1975, the House Committee on Appropriations
continued to earmark money for the project.70 These appropria-
tions bills eventually became law.71 In its June 2, 1977, Report,
the House Appropriations Committee stated:
It is the Committee's view that the Endangered Species Act
was not intended to halt projects such as these in their ad-
vanced stage of completion, and [the Committee] strongly rec-
ommends that these projects not be stopped because of misuse
of the Act.72
The Senate Appropriations Committee expressed similar .views.
This committee has not viewed the Endangered Species Act as
preventing the completion and use of these projects[,] which
were well under way at the time the affected species were listed
as endangered. If the act has such an effect, which is contrary
to the Committee's understanding of the intent of Congress in
enacting the Endangered Species Act, funds should be appro-
priated to allow these projects to be completed and their bene-
fits realized in the public interest, the Endangered Species Act
notwithstanding.73
It is doubtful that Congress intended to protect endangered
species only where it was a matter of convenience. The Court un-
derstood that the "plain intent of Congress in enacting this stat-
ute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost."' 74
69. Id. at 162.
70. Id. at 164.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 170 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-379, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 104 (1977)).
73. Id. at 171 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-301, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at
99 (1977)).
74. Id. at 184. Ironically, this understanding came from a floor
statement, an even less reliable source. See infra Part II.
Once this bill is enacted, the appropriate Secretary, whether
of Interior, Agriculture or whatever, will have to take action
to see that this situation is not permitted to worsen, and that
these bears are not driven to extinction. The purposes of the
bill included the conservation of the species and of the eco-
systems upon which they depend, and every agency of gov-
ernment is committed to see that those purposes are carried
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The Court correctly refused to honor the Appropriations Com-
mittees' "understanding". 75 In doing so, the Court pointed to
House Rule XXI(2),76 which provides:
No appropriation shall be reported in any general appropria-
tion bill, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for any ex-
penditure not previously authorized by law, unless in continua-
tion of appropriations for such works as are already in progress.
Nor shall any provision in any such bill or amendment thereto
changing existing law be in order.77
In this case, it appears that Congress attempted to legislate
through an appropriations measure. The proper process would
be for the House Committee responsible for authorizing the ESA
to consider legislation exempting the Tellico Dam. If such legisla-
tion were passed, the continued appropriations would have been
proper. However, here, the Appropriations Committees lacked
the authority to unilaterally decide that the Tellico Dam did not
violate the ESA.
Additionally, the relevant legislative history, in the form of
Committee Reports, was not written concurrently with the ESA's
journey through the legislative process. The proponents of the
Tellico Dam would have had a better case had the ESA or its ac-
companying reports provided an exemption for the Dam. The
Court was not fooled here. The decision was correct in disre-
garding the statements of the Appropriations Committees. As a
result, the Court provides a positive example of an instance
where reliance on certain legislative history would have distorted
the outcome by leading to an erroneous interpretation of a
statute.
out .... [T]he agencies of Government can no longer plead
that they can do nothing about it. They can, and they must.
The law is clear.
Id. (quoting 119 CONG. REc. 42,913 (1973) (emphasis added)).
75. Id. at 191.
76. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE To CONGRESS 39-A (4th ed.
1991).
77. Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 191 (quoting House Rule XXI
(2)).
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2. Additional Considerations
a) Rules of The Environmental Committees
In understanding the potential problems with the Committee
Reports in Tennessee Valley Authority, it is necessary to grasp the
fact that all committees do not have identical rules regarding the
structure and contents of Committee Reports. As long as courts
continue to rely on these Reports, it is necessary to understand
that Reports from different committees can not be subject to
uniform examination. The inquiry must be tailored to the rules
of the individual committee that proffered the Report. This sec-
tion addresses the procedures adopted by three House Commit-
tees: the House Committee on Resources, 78 the House Commit-
tee on Agriculture, and the House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure. 9 These committees are responsible for the
bulk of environmental legislation that is introduced in the cur-
rent House of Representatives. While the explanations following
do not encompass all of the rules for these House Committees,
they illustrate many of the differences present. The descriptions
are relevant to show why courts must look at the rules of a com-
mittee before undertaking any analysis of that committee's
Reports.
When the House Committee on Resources approves a mea-
sure,80 the Committee Report must be filed within seven calendar
days after the day on which a written request is filed with the
Committee Clerk for the reporting of the measure.81 Any Mem-
ber may, if notice is given at the time a bill or resolution is ap-
proved by the committee, file supplemental, additional, or mi-
nority views. 82 Members must be given at least two additional
78. This committee was known as the House of Representatives
Committee on Natural Resources prior to the 104th Congress.
79. This committee was known as the House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation prior to the 104th Congress.
80. See generally Rules Of Procedure For The Committee On Resources
105th Congress, 143 CONG. REc. H331-01 (1997).
81. 143 CONG. REc. H332 (1997). Days in which the House of Rep-
resentatives is not in session do not count against the seven day dead-
line. See id. The request must be signed by a majority of the members
of the committee. See id.
82. See id.
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calendar days to file these views.83 Each Member of the commit-
tee is given the opportunity to review each proposed Committee
Report before it is filed with the Clerk of the House of Repre-
sentatives. 84 Committee Reports are available in government de-
pository libraries. Committee documents are not yet available
over the Internet but will be soon.8
When the House Committee on Agriculture approves a mea-
sure,86 a report must be filed within seven calendar days after the
day on which a written request is filed with the Majority Staff Di-
rector for the reporting of the measure. 87 Members are entitled
to at least two subsequent calendar days to file supplemental, mi-
nority, or additional views. 88 The Agriculture Committee also
specifies what is to be included in a Report. In separately identi-
fied sections, the Report must contain, among other things, a
statement of intent or purpose and a statement describing the
need for the measure and oversight findings.8 9 A court is likely to
seize upon this information in the Committee Report without re-
alizing that these statements often represent only the views of a
fraction of the committee's membership.
When the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastruc-
ture approves a measure, 90 the committee must file a Report
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See Committee on Resources Home Page (last modified Mar.
21, 1997) <http://www.house.gov/resources/>. While committee publi-
cations are not yet available, one can access information regarding the
committee schedule, membership, meetings, oversight activities and
press releases. The Committee on Resources can also be reached via e-
mail at <resources.committee@mail.house.gov.>.
86. For a list of approving procedures, see generally Rules Of Proce-





90. For a list of approving procedures, see generally, Rules Of Proce-
dure For The Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure, 105th Con-
gress, 143 CONG. REc. H328-01 (1997); Amendment To The Rules Of Proce-
dure For The Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure 105th Congress,
143 CONG. REc. H929-01 (1997).
198 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
within seven calendar days9' after the day on which it has been
filed with the Clerk of the House for reporting. 92 The committee
rules contain no specifications for Committee Reports. As a re-
sult, a thorough examination of a Committee Report would re-
quire a court to determine the reasons why certain information
might have been excluded.
b) The Stage at Which Committee Reports are Created
A Senate Committee Report reflects an interpretation of a Sen-
ate bill before it reaches the floor, and a House Committee Re-
port reflects an interpretation of a House Bill before it reaches
the floor. Neither becomes law in its original form. The bills may
be changed significantly on the floor of each chamber.93 The re-
sulting law is a compromise between the House and Senate
versions.
Thus, in Tennessee Valley Authority, the law that eventually was
passed certainly could not live up to all the intentions of either
report because compromises had been made as part of the legis-
lative process. The report language could at most represent the
intent of one chamber, before it reached agreement with the
other.
C. Additional Problems with Judicial Use of Committee Reports
While many scholars maintain that Committee Reports are a
credible source for determining the intent of Congress when a
bill is enacted,94 often legislators are unaware of the importance
that courts attribute to Committee Reports. 95 This is evidenced
91. This excludes days which the House is not in session. See 143
CONG. REC. H328-01 (1997)
92. See id.
93. Usually, there is the opportunity to offer amendments when a
bill initially reaches the floor. An amendment may even take the form
of a "substitute," which if passed, replaces the entire text of a bill with
new text. Additionally, further amendments are made in conference
committee.
94. See RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
269-70 (1985).
95. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, supra note 21, at 184 ("I
also wish that Congress would realize how central Committee Reports
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by the frequency with which courts turn to reports in published
decisions. Committee Reports are the frequent victims of "politi-
cal horse trading and individual ego trips."96 As a result, "[t]he
Committee Report's central explanatory function is clouded
when it is called upon to serve other purposes. '97 Thus, an exam-
ining judge cannot discern which part of a report serves a legiti-
mate legislative function.
The analysis provided in congressional Committee Reports
usually consists of "mere paraphrases of the statute, and the devi-
ations from statutory text are not likely to be helpful. '98 The
analysis simply takes legislative language and provides a plain En-
glish summary. In sum, this explanatory material is intended to
illustrate, but not "to resolve ambiguities that [may] have con-
sciously been included or retained by the authors."99
Finally, problems also may result from "joint referrals": a pro-
cess in which the House often referred legislation to two differ-
ent committees with overlapping jurisdiction, and which existed
until the end of the 103rd Congress. 1°° Thus, the possibility arose
of there being reports from separate committees on the same
bill. This creates an opening for judicial misinterpretation if the
separate committees take contradicting views.
II. FLOOR STATEMENTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Not only do the courts to turn to the Record to interpret what
statutes might mean in the cases of ambiguity, but historians
not only in this century but in the next century will turn to
these very Records when they come to pass judgment on what
we have all done in these times. I0 '
Representative Charles Pashayan
As you know, the Record has often been subject to criticism for
its lack of accuracy in relation to the actual floor proceedings
are to any rational search for 'legislative intent.' ").
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Dickerson, Dipping Into Legislative History, supra note 5, at
1132.
99. Brudney, supra note 20, at 29-30.
100. See 139 CONG. REc. H17 (1993).
101. 131 CONG. REc. 11074 (1985) (statement of Rep. Pashayan).
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which it was meant to report. I have always supported the no-
tion of greater compliance with the rules and the restrictions
associated with revisions to Members' statements. I firmly be-
lieve that the Laws and Rules for Publication of the Congressional
Record, if properly enforced, would result in a more accurate
publication. I also believe that Members should be subject to
stricter limitations on the length, content, and location of their
remarks in the daily Record .... 102
Senator Charles Mathias
This section shows the dangers of judicial use of congressional
floor statements in interpreting environmental law. It presents
both technical and political reasons why legislative debates and
other Floor Statements are ill-suited for reliance by courts. Legis-
lative debates "are not a safe guide ... in ascertaining the mean-
ing and purpose of the law-making body" because they are
merely "expressive of the views and motives of individual mem-
bers." 103 The analysis also addresses the rules governing the con-
tent of the Congressional Record, specifically explaining how Mem-
bers of Congress can delete, add, and modify statements from
their original form.
A. The Surface Mining Control And Reclamation Act (SMCRA)
1. The Use of Legislative History
Representative Morris Udall, a Congressman from Arizona,
had previously passed versions of SMCRA104 through the House,
102. 136 CONG. REc. 37,126-7 (1990) (Letter of Feb. 4, 1986 from
then Chairman of the Joint Comm. on Printing, Sen. Charles Mathias,
to Rep. Frank Annunzio, Chairman Comm. on House Admin.).
103. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474
(1921).
104. For a more comprehensive discussion, see Abner J. Mikva, A
Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DuKE LJ. 380 (1987) [hereinafter
Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr]. While Judge Mikva identifies the legisla-
tion as the "Strip Mining Law," the actual title is the Surface Mining
Control And Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-
1328 (1994). The House of Representatives debated the Conference Re-
port on July 21, 1977. See 123 CONG. lUc. 24, 419-30 (1977). While the
recorded debate does not precisely match Judge Mikva's recollections,
there was debate involving Congressmen Udall (the floor manager),
Rahall (of West Virginia) and Tsongas (the pro-environmental congress-
man). The theme of their discussion parallels Judge Mikva's story. See
id. at 24,424-26. However, for illustrative purposes, I have utilized Judge
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but failed on his first attempt to move it through the Senate. 105
In his second attempt, Udall succeeded in passing the legislation
through both chambers before President Ford vetoed it.10 6 Repre-
sentative Udall "finally got a Democratic president who commit-
ted himself to signing a bill if Representative Udall could get it
through Congress."
0 7
Surface mining is a controversial topic when it comes to natu-
ral resources conservation and management. 10 8 The expected op-
position to Representative Udall's goals indicated that there
"were directly opposing views to reconcile in fashioning a bill."'10 9
"The miners and mine owners, the 'states' righters,' and the en-
vironmentalists each have very strong views on what the strip
mining laws should be."" l0
This controversy gave rise to the following events, which are
recounted by Judge Abner Mikva:"'
Representative Udall fashioned a compromise and got it out of
the committee and onto the floor. At one point, in his effort to
shepherd the compromise through the House of Representa-
tives, Udall, as floor manager, was explaining why it was a great
bill and why it ought to be passed. One of the congressmen
from West Virginia, a strip-mining state, arose and asked if the
gentleman from Arizona would assure him that this bill would
carefully protect states' rights and state sovereignty and that the
states would continue to perform their role in managing strip
mining within their borders. Representative Udall solemnly as-
sured the gentleman that he was absolutely correct, that the bill
very carefully preserved the role of the states in the process -
state sovereignty was not impinged upon in any form.
Mikva's recollections.
105. Mikva, A Reply To Judge Starr, supra note 104, at 380-81.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See generally Uday Desai, The Politics Of Federal State Relations:
The Case of Surface Mining Regulation, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 785 (1991).
109. Mikva, A Reply To Judge Starr, supra note 104, at 380-81.
110. Id.
111. Abner Mikva served five terms in the Illinois Legislature, fol-
lowed by five terms in the U.S. House of Representatives; he was Cir-
cuit Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
from 1979 to 1994; he served as counsel to the President of the United
States from 1994 to 1996. He is currently a Visiting Professor of Law at
the University of Chicago Law School.
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Twenty minutes later a pro-environmentalist congressman arose
and asked if the gentleman from Arizona would assure him
that the bill, once and for all, set single standards for strip min-
ing and ensured that one federal law would cover strip mining
throughout the country. Representative Udall assured the gen-
tleman that he was absolutely correct, that this bill, once and
for all, set uniform federal standards.
Some of us were sitting in the cloakroom during this exchange;
when Representative Udall came out for a drink of water one
of the congressmen who has been listening in told him that
both positions could not be right. Udall then assured that gen-
tleman that he was absolutely correct. 112
Because of political circumstances, Representative Udall had
few options. Perhaps he could have "spen[t] another twenty
years trying to find more precise words to set forth his ideas con-
cerning proper strip-mining law, even though he might never get
218 of his colleagues to agree with him again." 113
According to Judge Mikva, "[i] t is not surprising that when the
statute came before the courts there were some ambiguities. It
simply was not as clear as it might have been in describing when
the state was supposed to act and when the federal government
was supposed to act."' 114
This ambiguity is clearly demonstrated in In re Surface Mining
Regulation Litigation.'15 The court looked to statements made by
Congressmen Ruppe1 16 and Tsongas 7 to explain a clause within
the legislation:1 8 "[t]he statement of Congressman Tsongas di-
rectly conflicts with other indications of the legislative history...
and also contradicts the words of the statute .. ."119 Unfortu-
nately, the court opted to weigh the relative strengths of floor
statements and decided that, "the interpretations of the...
clause expressed in the Senate are better evidence of its true
112. Mikva, A Reply ToJudge Starr, supra note 104, at 381.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 627 F2d 1346
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
116. 123 CONG. REc. H7591 (daily ed. July 21, 1977) (statement of
Rep. Ruppe).
117. 123 CONG. REc. H7599-89 (daily ed. July 21, 1977) (statements
of Rep. Tsongas).
118. In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 627 F.2d at 1362.
119. Id.
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meaning than the inconsistent pronouncements in the
House .... -120 This is a prime example of misuse. While the
court was in a position to acknowledge the ambiguity, it had no
real way of knowing which floor statements were "better evi-
dence" of the statute's "true meaning." Sadly enough, a. majority
of the Members of Congress in the House may not have under-
stood the legislation they were discussing.
Judge Mikva explains that he "would have gone back to the
Committee Report, as [he] think[s] most of the judges who were
involved in the various disputes [over SMCRA] did." 121 Finally, he
"would have resolved most of the disputes in favor of federal
supremacy -on the ground that most of the fight over this stat-
ute was about whether there was going to be a set of federal
standards superimposed on the states."'' 22 Predictably, Judge
Mikva held true to his word, in In re Permanent Surface Mining
Regulation Litigation,23 where he held that the Secretary of Inte-
rior possessed the authority to "specify by regulation criteria nec-
essary for his approval of a proposed state program." 24
Certainly, a review of Representative Udall's statements would
not have been enlightening in an effort to clarify ambiguity.
Judge Mikva's recollection shows that Members may not under-
stand legislation to mean the same thing reflected in a transcrip-
tion of a floor exchange.
2. Additional Considerations
Whenever a court makes use of floor statements, it must ques-
tion the accuracy of the printed word. Such a rule is especially
relevant with regard to SMCRA, because Judge Mikva's recollec-
tion does not entirely coincide with the picture presented by the
printed word. For the following reasons, there is great uncer-
tainty as to whether the printed legislative history or Judge
Mikva's recollections are more accurate.
The Constitution requires that "Each House shall keep a Jour-
nal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
120. Id.
121. Mikva, A Reply To Judge Starr, supra note 104, at 382.
122. Id.
123. 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
124. Id. at 527.
204 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
same."' 125 Additionally, federal statute requires that the Congres-
sional Record "shall be substantially a verbatim report of proceed-
ings[.]" 2 6 According to Our American Government, an introduc-
tory pamphlet to the United States Government, "[t]he
Congressional Record contains a record, taken stenographically, of
everything said on the floor of both Houses, including roll-call
votes on all questions."'27 However, the, text of this pamphlet,
which is itself issued by Congress, is, in itself, quite misleading. 28
The Congressional Record is not a verbatim report of what occurs
on the floor of either chamber, but only reflects a substantial re-
cord of the proceedings. 12 9 In 1984, several Members of Congress
brought an action for declaratory relief, alleging that the Congres-
sional Record contained improper material. 30 The complaint de-
manded that "the court order the Congressional Reporters, and
the Joint Committee on Printing to stop printing a corrupt Con-
gressional Record.' 131 The case was subsequently dismissed, 132 and
the plaintiffs appealed. 33
In concluding that there was no First Amendment right to re-
ceive a verbatim transcript of congressional proceedings, Judge
Mikva wrote:
For 200 years, Congress has institutionally determined and re-
determined the question of what kind of printed (and elec-
tronic) record should be kept of proceedings of that body. It is
most unlikely that any procedure has ever fully satisfied every
member of the Congress or their constituents. This court can-
not provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure.
Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly ten-
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
126. 44 U.S.C. § 901 (1997).
127. OUR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, H.R. Doc. No. 102-192, at 21
(1993).
128. Our American Government is printed by authority of H.R. Con.
Res. 172, 102d Cong. "Resolved by the House of Representatives (the
Senate concurring), that a revised edition of the booklet entitled "Our
American Government" shall be printed as a House Document. Id. at
II.
129. J. KERNOCHAN, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 46-47 (1981).
130. Gregg v. Barrett, 594 E Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1984).
131. Id. at 109.
132. Id. at 111.
133. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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dered to individual congressional actors, our deference and es-
teem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional
command that the institution be allowed to manage its own af-
fairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the
problem. 134
Thus, the problem was left to Congress to solve on its own; un-
fortunately, a palpable solution is not imminent.
"As it goes into the Record, House debate is thus a curious
melange of the opening lines of many speeches never heard on
the floor, coupled with revised, sometimes totally new, re-
marks. . . . [M]embers in both houses rearrange the facts and
rewrite bits and chunks of historical record."1 35 Furthermore, the
Congressional Record does not reflect how many Members were
present on the floor of the chamber when a statement was made.
Thus, even if a statement is reported verbatim, there is no assur-
ance that anyone ever heard it.
Some 20 million C-SPAN viewers know what is really said on
this floor. Why should we maintain a fictional Congressional Re-
cord when we now have a factual electronic record that tells it
like it is rather than how we wish we had said it?136
Representative Trent Lott
Conversely, one of the chief problems with the Congressional
Record's reporting of House floor debates is that not all state-
ments are necessarily included. As a result, the record of activity
may be incomplete. "Remarks made on the floor by a Member
after he has been called to order, without recognition by the
Chair, or without consent of the Member occupying the floor,
are frequently deleted from the Record by the House,, the
Speaker, or the Member in revising his remarks." 137
Additionally, "the House frequently excludes from the Record
remarks made out of order or unparliamentary remarks which
reflect unfavorably upon the House, its committees or individual
Members."' 38 In such a situation, the Member immediately re-
grets what she said. She "may request the unanimous consent of
134. Id. at 549.
135. W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 258
(5th ed. 1981).
136. 131 CONG. REC. H6893-04 (1985) (statement of Rep. Lott).
137. DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS ch. 5, § 17 if; see also 136 CONG. REC.
E3626-0l.
138. DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS ch. 5, § 17 ff; see also 136 CONG. REC.
E3626-01.
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the House that they be deleted from the Record or such request
may be made by another Member. The House frequently agrees
to these requests made in the spirit of apology."139
Finally, a Member of Congress may demand that words spoken
by another Member be "taken down." If the Speaker determines
that the words reflect unfavorably on the House and conse-
quently rules the words unparliamentary, a resolution may be
made to delete the unparliamentary remarks from the Record.'4°
On some occasions, the Speaker, by unanimous consent, will im-
mediately order the unparliamentary remarks deleted from the
Record, without awaiting action by the House.14 1
Mr. Speaker, having received unanimous consent to extend my
remarks in the Record, I would like to indicate that I am not re-
ally speaking these words. Try as I might, I could not get to the
floor to deliver my plea on behalf of the coal miners disabled
by pneumoconiosis. I do not want to kid anyone into thinking
that I am now on my feet delivering a stirring oration. As a
matter of fact, I am back in my office typing this out on my
own hot little typewriter, far from the madding crowd, and
somewhat removed from the House Chamber. Such is the pre-
tense of the House that it would have been easy to just quietly
include these remarks in the Record, issue a brave press release,
and convince thousands of cheering constituents that I was in
there fighting every step of the way, influencing the course of
history in the heat of debate. 142
Representative Ken Hechler
When a Member of Congress rises to speak in front of the
House of Representatives, the first thing she does is seek permis-
sion to "revise and extend" her remarks. TJ'he general authority
provided to "revise and extend" is subject to limitations estab-
lished in rules and precedents. 143 It has long been the practice of
the House for a Member to edit and revise his remarks before
139. DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS ch. 5, § 17 if; see also 136 CONG. REC.
E3626-01.
140. DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS ch. 5, § 17 if; see also 136 CONG. REC.
E3626-0l.
141. DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS ch. 5, § 17 if; see also 136 CONG. REC.
E3626-01.
142. 117 CONG. REc. 36,506 (1971).
143. See LAWS AND RULES FOR PUBLICATION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD 4.
[Vol. IX
1997] LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 207
publication in the Record. 44 A Member has until 9:00 P.M. to edit
a manuscript before it is printed in the daily edition of the Con-
gressional Record, issued on the following day. 45
The permanent edition of the Congressional Record is made up
for printing and binding thirty days after each daily publication
is issued. 146 The Rules provide that a Member may only make
one set of revisions to a statement. 47 These revisions are limited
to correction of "grammatical or technical matters that do not al-
ter in any material way the substance of the remarks." 48 Revi-
sions in excess of this are improper and may be challenged.' 49
Adherence to the rules permitting only technical corrections also
minimizes potential mischief from revisions. 5° Some have al-
leged, however, that substantive changes can be made under the
guise of technical corrections. 51 Because of the huge amount of
printed material, it is unlikely that violators will be caught.
There are additional limitations on the authority to revise. A
Member may not delete proceedings by which his words are
taken down, remarks interjected by another Member to whom
he has yielded, or to whom he has responded. 52 Additionally, a
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 9.
147. See id.
148. 136 CONG. REC. E3627-01 (1990).
149. Id.
150. Under the governing rule issued by the Joint Committee on
Printing, revisions "shall consist only of corrections of the original copy
and shall not include deletions of correct material, substitutions for
correct material, or additions of new subject matter." See generally JOINT
COMM. ON PRINTING, LAWS AND RULES FOR PUBLICATION OF THE CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD. Similar restrictions also appear in a House Supplement.
"The Congressional Record shall contain a substantially verbatim ac-
count of remarks actually made during proceedings of the house, sub-
ject to technical, grammatical, and typographical corrections author-
ized by the Member making remarks involved. HOUSE SUPPLEMENT To
LAWS AND RULES FOR PUBLICATION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD (Mar.
10, 1980) [hereinafter HOUSE SUPPLEMENT].
151. See, e.g., Gregg, 771 F.2d at 540 (dismissing complaint by sev-
eral members alleging that Congressional Record "is not a faithful
transcript of what is actually said on the floor of the House and
Senate").
152. 136 CONG. REC. E3627-01 (1990). "Any revision shall consist
only of corrections of the original copy and shall not include deletions
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Member may not revise remarks that alter the text of colloquies
with other Members without their consent.'53 "The consent of
the House is required, for the correction of major errors or the
deletion of unparliamentary remarks or remarks made out of or-
der."154 Certainly, these technical rules alone are enough to dis-
courage reliance on any floor statements, for fear that the
printed word may portray the actual record inaccurately.
B. Jurisdiction of The District Courts Under CERCLA
In United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech,155 the Third Circuit
dealt with conflicting legislative history regarding the citizen's
suit provision of Superfund.' 56 With regard to jurisdiction, CER-
CLA provides that the "United States district courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under
this chapter, without regard to the citizenship of the parties or
the amount in controversy."15 7 This general grant of jurisdiction
is limited, however by a section titled "Timing of Review".15 . The
restrictions provide that
[n]o Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law...
to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected
under section 9604 .. .in any action except... :
(1) An action under section 9607 of this title to recover re-
sponse costs or damages for contribution ...
... [and]
(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citi-
zens' suits) alleging that the removal or remedial action taken
under section 9604 of this title or secured under 9606 of this ti-
* tle was in violation of any requirement of this chapter. Such an
of correct material, substitutions for correct material, or additions of
new subject matter." JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, supra note 150, at 9.
153. 136 CONG. REc. E3627-01 (1990).
154. Id.
155. 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994), overruled by Clinton County
Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, _ U.S. __,
118 S. Ct. 687 (1998).
156. For more detailed discussion about this case, see Paul H. Mc-
Connell, Note, CERCLA Wrestling -Grappling With Conflicting Legislative
Intent And The Citizens' Suit Provision -United States v. Princeton
Gamma-Tech, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 115 (1995).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b).
158. Id. § 9613(h).
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action may not be brought with regard to a removal where a
remedial action is to be undertaken at the site ....
As Paul H. McConnell notes:
Thus, section 9613(h) is a broadly-worded provision that fore-
closes judicial review of CERCLA cleanups unless the review ac-
tion falls within one of several narrowly defined exceptions.
Notwithstanding the terms of the provision foreclosing review,
litigants have turned to the courts, asserting various theories in
order to gain immediate review.159
CERCLA enumerates a specific statutory scheme for judicial
review of lawsuits arising under CERCLA's provisions. 160 In
Princeton Gamma-Tech,16' the court held that:
[B]ased on review of the statute, its legislative history, and the
procedural posture of th[e] suit, where a bona fide allegation
of irreparable injury to public health or the environment is
made, injunctive relief is available in a cost-recovery action
under subsection 9613(h) (1) and/or 9613(h) (4).162
The Third Circuit noted that the legislative history concerning
when a citizens' suit may be entertained was "confusing." 63 To
support its finding the Third Circuit compared conflicting state-
ments made on the floor by individual conferees. 164 Initially the
court quoted Senator Thurmond's statement which stands for
the proposition that a federal court will not have jurisdiction
under citizens' suit challenges until the EPA has totally com-
pleted its cleanup activities: 165
'Taken or secured' [in section 9613(h)(4)], means that all of
the activities set forth in the record of decision which includes
the challenged action have been completed .... The section is
designed to preclude lawsuits by any person concerning partic-
ular segments of the response action . . . until those segments
of the response have been constructed and given the chance to
operate and demonstrate their effectiveness in meeting the re-
quirements of the act. Completion of all of the work set out in
159. McConnell, supra note 156, at 116.
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
161. 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994).
162. McConnell, supra note 156, at 116 (citing Princeton Gamma-
Tech, 31 E3d at 148).
163. 31 F.3d at 144.
164. See id. at 145-46.
165. McConnell, supra note 156, at 120 (quoting Princeton Gamma-
Tech, 31 F3d at 145).
210 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
a particular record of decision marks the first opportunity at
which review of that portion of the response action can
occur.
16
The Third Circuit then contrasted these statements with those
made by other conferees.1 67 For example, Senator Stafford, the
Chairman of the Committee on Environment and Public Works,
(the Senate committee primarily responsible for the bill) stated:
It is crucial, if it is at all possible, to maintain citizens' rights to
challenge response actions, or final cleanup plans, before such
plans are implemented even in part because otherwise the re-
sponse could proceed in violation of the law and waste millions
of dollars of Superfund money before a court has considered
the illegality .... Citizens asserting a true public health or en-
vironmental interest in the response cannot obtain adequate re-
lief if an inadequate cleanup is allowed to proceed .... 168
The court also considered "similar statements by Senator
Mitchell 169 and Representative Florio,170 which also stood for the
166. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 145 (citing 132 CONG. REC.
28,441 (1986) (statements of Sen. Thurmond)). For comments along
similar lines in the House debate, see Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at
145 (citing 132 CONG. REC. 29,736 (1986) (statements of Rep.
Glickman)).
167. See id. at 145-46.
168. Id. at 145 (citing 132 CONG. REc. 28,409 (1986) (statement of
Sen. Stafford)).
169.
Clearly the risk to the public health is more of an irrepara-
ble injury than the momentary loss of money .... The pub-
lic, however, has no recourse if their [sic] health has been
impaired. For this reason, courts should carefully weigh the
equities and give great weight to the public health risks
involved.
Id. at 145 (citing 132 CONG. REc. 28,429 (1986) (statement of Sen.
Mitchell)).
170.
A final cleanup decision, or plan, constitutes the taking of
action at a site, and the legislative language makes it clear
that citizens' suits under [Sec. 9659] will lie alleging viola-
tions of law and irreparable injury to health as soon as -
and these words are a direct quote [from subsection
9613(h)(4)]- "action is taken."
Id. at 145 (citing 132 CONG. REc. 29,472 (1986) (statement of Rep.
Florio).
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idea that subsection 9613(h) (4) maintains citizens' rights to chal-
lenge EPA response plans before they are implemented when
their [sic] is risk of harm to the public health."17 As McConnell
notes further:
It is from these conflicting views of the members of Congress
who directly participated in the drafting of the statute, that the
Third Circuit determined that the legislative history was confus-
ing. The court than [sic] opined that a statement by Senator
Stafford provided a pragmatic guideline to interpreting subsec-
tion 9613(h) (4).172
Senator Stafford stated: 73
[T]he courts must draw appropriate distinctions between dila-
tory or other unauthorized lawsuits by potentially responsible
parties involving only monetary damages and legitimate citi-
zens' suits complaining of irreparable injury that can be only
addressed only [sic] if a claim is heard during or prior to [a]
response action. 174
McConnell comments: "After determining that the language of
the statute, and its legislative history was inconclusive as to when
a citizen's suit may be entertained, the Third Circuit opted to
follow the objectives of CERCLA and allow the right to the rem-
edy envisioned by the citizens suit provision." 75 The Third Cir-
cuit held that "by differentiation between compensatory and ir-
reparable injury, a District Court has jurisdiction to hear a
citizens' suit brought under section 9613(h)(4) even before the
completion of a distinct phase of the cleanup, when irreparable
harm to public health or the environment is threatened." 76
The Princeton Gamma-Tech court was not the last to examine
the legislative history of this provision. In United States v. NL In-
dus., Inc., 177 a district court in Illinois approached the meaning of
section 9613(h) by examining the reports of the House Public
Works and Transportation Committee and the House Judiciary
171. McConnell, supra note 156, at 120.
172. Id. at 120-21.
173. McConnell, supra note 156, at 120-21 (citing Princeton Gamma-
Tech, 31 F.3d at 144-45).
174. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 146 (citing 132 CONG. REC.
28,409 (1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford)).
175. McConnell, supra note 156, at 122.
176. Id. at 122 (citing Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 148-49).
177. 936 E Supp. 545 (S.D. Ill. 1996)
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Committee. 178 Utilizing these sources, the court concluded that
section 9613(h) "does not provide federal courts with jurisdiction
to enjoin an ongoing remedial action.' 179 Thus by using Commit-
tee Reports, instead of floor statements, the court arrived at a
holding opposite to that of the court in Princeton Gamma-Tech.
Notably, in Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA,8 0 the Third Circuit re-
versed its earlier holding in Princeton Gamma-Tech; in this in-
stance, the court relied on both the Committee Reports and the
House floor statements.' 8 '
Princeton Gamma-Tech is an example of a court looking at legis-
lative history simply for the exercise of the process. This is a
problem because it lends credibility to certain legislative history,
even though it was not crucial to the court's decision. By using
legislative history in this roundabout way, the court assumes
there is some legitimacy in its examination. As a result of their
citing the legislative history, it is likely the discussion of the floor
statements, although they are not crucial to the holding, are
likely to retain some precedential value. This will have the nega-
tive effect of leading future courts to believe the legitimacy of
these statements as the collective opinion of Congress.
2. Additional Considerations
Both floor statements and colloquies represent the views of
only a minority of members. Assuming that a statement was actu-
ally uttered on the floor, there is no guarantee that anyone
heard it. There may have been few or no other members on the
floor at the time. Additionally, if there had been others on the
floor, they may not have been paying attention, or may not have
known enough about the bill to participate in debate. Further-
more, they may not have been invited to participate in a scripted
exchange.
Often, legislative history is manufactured by Members of Con-
gress who believe such practice to be easier than attempting to
amend the legislation to incorporate their views. "All it takes is
178. Id. at 550 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-253(V), at 22, 25-26
(19-)).
179. Id. at 551.
180. 116 E3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 118 S.
Ct. 687 (1998).
181. See id. at 1023-24.
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one [m]ember of Congress declaring on the floor his or her 'un-
derstanding' of what some vague portion of the bill is 'intended
to mean.' "182
It is not uncommon for a Member to go to the floor and
make a statement on an issue not currently in debate, simply to
satisfy an unhappy constituent or interest group.8 3 This type of
gesture is often demanded by politics, and its result should not
be considered a meaningful part of the legislative process. Unfor-
tunately, a judge could potentially use such an unreliable state-
ment from the Congressional Record and arrive at an incorrect
result. 184
C. Hirschey v. FERC 85
A colloquy is an exchange on the House floor, intended to
flesh out the meaning of some particular part of a bill. In the
usual scenario, the two members involved in the colloquy, the
sponsor of the bill and another member, cooperate in this ex-
change. "The second member asks the sponsor what the bill is
intended to mean, and the sponsor answers."186
Colloquies are not spontaneous eruptions of debate; they are
staged exchanges. "Frequently . .. the colloquy is written by just
one of the members, not both. It is handed to the other actor
and the two of them read like a grade B radio script." 8 7 Most
often, colloquies are not designed to persuade or inform other
members. These exchanges are targeted for a judicial audience,
which later will examine these debates to gauge what the institu-
tion itself actually "intended" when it enacted the legislation. 188
According to Judge Mikva, "that is the material that judges later
will solemnly pore over, under the guise of 'studying the legisla-
182. Slawson, supra note 4, at 397.
183. See Hatch, supra note 6, at 45.
184. See id.
185. 777 E2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
186. Slawson, supra note 4, at 397.
187. Mikva, A Reply To Judge Starr, supra note 104, at 384.
188. See William S. Moorhead, A Congressman Looks at the Planned
Colloquy and Its Effect in the Interpretation of Statutes, 45 A.B.A. J. 1314
(1959).
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tive history.' "189
In his concurring opinion in Hirschey v. FERC, Judge Scalia
used a Senate colloquy to show that "members may be divided
on whether [legislative] history reflects their understanding" 90 of
legislation. In the quoted exchange, Senator Armstrong chal-
lenged whether Senator Dole had actually read a Committee Re-
port.19' He further questioned whether any Senator had actually
done so. 192 Senator Armstrong clarified:
[F]or any jurist, administrator, bureaucrat . . . or others who
might chance upon the written record of this proceeding, let
me just make the point that this is not the law, it was not voted
on, it is not subject to amendment, and we should discipline
ourselves to the task of expressing congressional intent in the
statute. 93
In this situation, the court used one type of legislative history,
a colloquy, to prove the illegitimacy of another type, the Com-
mittee Report. When reading the Congressional Record, there is no
way for a court to distinguish between " 'hot debate' which really
tells a reviewing court what was troubling the Congress and what
the majority wanted to achieve, and the pas de deux where two
members get up and read a congressional version of a psycho-
drama from a prepared script."1 94 By using a colloquy to under-
cut the value of some other legislative history, the court shows
that is does not understand the severity of the problem. If a
Committee Report is not appropriate for a court to use, then
why is a colloquy?
D. Additional Problems With Judicial Use of Floor Statements
The "extensions of remarks" is an appendix that contains ma-
terial that has not been spoken on the floor, but is subsequently
inserted in the Congressional Record with permission. 95 The rules
require that the lead item among the extensions be "desig-
189. Mikva, A Reply To Judge Starr, supra note 104, at 384.
190. 777 F.2d 1, 7 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing 128 CONG. REc. 88659 (daily ed. July 19, 1982)).
194. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, supra note 21, at 185.
195. OUR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, H.R. Doc. No. 102-192, at 21
(1993).
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nate[d] and distinctly mark[ed]. "196 The procedures for inserted
statements differ in each chamber.
When a Senator submits an unspoken statement for insertion
into the body of the Congressional Record, she must personally
bring the printed copy of the remarks to the Legislative Clerk in
the Senate chamber.197 The usual practice is that it will be "edito-
rially gathered" and placed under the heading "Additional State-
ments." 98 However, statements may be printed at other locations
in the Congressional Record, when in "the editorial judgment of
the Chief of Official Reporters, it is essential to do so in the in-
terest of continuity and germaneness."' 99 Allowing the unspoken
statement to be printed in other locations is certainly a great way
to fool courts into believing that the statement was actually
made.
A representative may insert material in a section marked "Gen-
eral Leave," following the debate of the legislation it concerns, as
long as he has permission of the bill's floor manager.2°° A repre-
sentative may have any "extraneous matter" printed in the Con-
gressional Record, by merely obtaining the permission of the Act-
ing Speaker.201 Furthermore, the representative need not present
the remarks personally, as in the Senate; it simply must be sub-
mitted to the Official Reporter of Debates with the actual signa-
ture of the member.20 2
The problem of identifying statements that have not been ac-
tually spoken is addressed by the requirement that they be pre-
ceded by a bullet symbol. 20 3 This certainly represents an improve-
196. JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, supra 150, at 11.
197. Senate Supplement To "Laws and Rules for Publication of the
Congressional Record" -Effective February 10, 1970, at 1.
198. Id. at 2.
199. Id. at 3.
200. HOUSE SUPPLEMENT, supra note 150, at 3.
201. Id. at 1-3.
202. Id. at 6. In the words of the Rules, the term signature is itali-
cized for emphasis. However, it is common in most Congressional of-
fices for staff members to sign the Representative's name on the
printed copy of remarks.
203. "Only as an aid in distinguishing the manner of delivery in
order to contribute to the historical accuracy of the Record, statements
or insertions in the Record where no part of them was spoken will be
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ment over the days when all insertions were included in the
stream of actual debate, without being distinguished in any
way.204
While the practice of bulleting unspoken remarks would seem
to provide a useful demarcation, Judge Mikva explains that
"most judges think that 'bullets' relate only to guns. The hard-
fought reform that requires a small dot (called a 'bullet') to ap-
pear before any speech in the Congressional Record that was not
delivered in person is a meaningless symbol to most judges. ' 20 5
Furthermore, "[t]his still permits a Member to utter just one sen-
tence of his speech, and it will appear in the RECORD without a
bullet, as if he delivered it all. '20 6
Legislative history is by nature incoherent. No institutional au-
thority controls its making. Any legislator who can get him or
herself recognized can stand up on the floor and make legisla-
tive history at any time. There is no requirement that the his-
tory of one part of a bill be consistent with other parts of the
bill, or even with the part to which it relates. There is no re-
quirement that it conform to a bill's basic purposes. In fact, a
point made by legislative history is likely not to conform to a
statute's basic purposes, because there would be less reason to
make it if it did. Most manufactured legislative history is defen-
sive -it is motivated by a fear that in its absence the statue will
be interpreted differently.207
Judge Wiggins does not put much reliance in floor statements
and other legislative materials.20 8 He explains that "[f]loor state-
ments, colloquies and Committee Reports are the product of in-
dividual legislators or their committee staff. They do not repre-
preceded and followed with a 'bullet' symbol, i.e., *" JOINT COMM. ON
PRINTING, supra 150, at 3.
204. 131 CONG. REc. H2972-03 (1985) (statement of Rep. Lott).
205. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, supra note 21, at 183. One
suggestion to alleviate this problem is to print remarks that were not
spoken in a different typeface. See 131 CONG. REc. H 11,948-03 (1985)
(statement of Rep. Foley).
206. 131 CONG. REc. H2972-03 (1985) (statement of Rep. Lott).
207. Slawson, supra note 4, at 407.
208. Letter from Judge Wiggins, supra note 4. Judge Wiggins' in-
sight is of special value because he served as a Member of Congress
from 1967 to 1969. He has served as a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit since 1984.
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sent the will of Congress. ' 20 9 Judge Fuster-Berlingeri concurs.
These statements and reports "often reflect the real purpose of
legislation only in limited ways. They are sources that should be
used with great caution." 210
Once legislation reaches the House floor most Members of
Congress are unaware of the detailed content of the bill. Instead,
it is likely that a legislator will condition her vote on recommen-
dations of colleagues who have taken leadership roles on the
particular bill.21 ' Additionally, advice is sought from lobbyists and
constituents who may possess an expertise in the subject that the
bill addresses. In short, Congress is a bureaucratic institution that
does not fit the image held by most judges or the general
population. 212
Judge Kenneth Starr 213 argues that only the record of speeches
on the floor of either chamber should be considered even mini-
mally probative of Congress' intent.214 He explains that at least
Members of Congress had the opportunity to hear these re-
marks. 15 He undermines his argument by noting that only a mi-
nority of Members usually hears these remarks, and their com-
prehension is usually quite superficial. 21 6
There are also many times when Members speak to mostly an
empty House. 217 This takes place every night that the House is in
209. Id. at 2.
210. Letter from Judge Fuster-Berlingeri, Justice, Commonwealth
of P.R., Sup. Ct. 2 (on file with author). Judge Fuster-Berlingeri's in-
sight is of special value because he served as a Member of Congress
from 1985 to 1992. He has served as a Judge on the Puerto Rico Su-
preme Court since 1992.
211. See Brudney, supra note 20, at 27.
212. See id. at 26-27; see also Breyer, supra note 5, at 858-59.
213. Judge Starr served as a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit from 1979 to 1994. He is currently the in-
dependent prosecutor for the Whitewater investigation.
214. Starr, supra note 49, at 375-76.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, supra note 21, at 185.
For several years, C-SPAN did not pan the gallery when televising the
House of Representatives. The cameras that televise the house are con-
trolled by the House's internal bureaucracy. During his tenure as
speaker, Tip O'Neill quietly told Congressional camera operators to
pan the empty chamber in order to show that few members, if any, at-
218 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
session in after-hours speeches known as "Special Orders." These
speeches are made to an empty House once the legislative busi-
ness for the day has been completed. If she is speaking to an
empty House, a Member may verbally challenge someone to con-
tradict her. The fact that there is no answer may simply be a re-
sult of the fact that nobody else is there. Again, this attacks the
validity of floor statements as a credible form of debate, because
it is quite possible that no one ever heard it.
III. CONFERENCE COMMIT[EE REPORTS
This section deals with the role conference Committee Reports
play in the legislative process. It will use an environmental exam-
ple to illustrate the inherent problems when courts use Confer-
ence Committee Reports.
A. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and the
Colorado Wilderness Act
In the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act,2 18 Con-
gress conferred a right of access to "inholdings" contained
within national forest areas. The relevant part the statute reads:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act or other law,
in any case in which State owned or privately owned land, in-
cluding subsurface rights of such owners underlying public
lands, or a valid mining claim or other valid occupancy is
within or is effectively surrounded by one or more conservation
system units, national recreation areas, national conservation ar-
eas, or those public lands designated as wilderness study, the
State or private owner or occupier shall be given by the Secre-
tary such rights as may be necessary to assure adequate and fea-
sible access for economic and other purposes to the concerned
tended the after hours speeches. Due to this change, television viewers
were able to see if statements were made to an empty house. The at-
tendance at a session, however, is indicated nowhere in the Congres-
sional Record. As a side note, in 1994, as part of its reform package,
the House Republican leadership ended the practice of panning the
floor. C-SPAN Networks Home Page (visited _ , 19_) <http://
www.c-span.org>.
218. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C.) [hereinafter the
"Alaska Act"].
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land by such State or private owner or occupier and their suc-
cessors in interest. Such rights shall be subject to reasonable
regulations issued by the Secretary to protect the natural and
other values of such lands.219
According to the Ninth Circuit, in Montana Wilderness Ass'n v.
U.S. Forest Serv., the statutory text was inconclusive as to whether
the provisions affected all national forests or only those in
Alaska. 22
0
In evaluating this supposed ambiguity, the court observed that
later in the same Congress, different versions of the Colorado
Wilderness Act 22 1 were passed by each chamber and sent to a
conference committee. The Senate version of the Colorado Act
conferred a similar right of access to inholdings in Colorado,
while the House version contained no provision on the subject.222
The conferees agreed to delete the Senate language, on the ex-
press understanding that the Alaska Act already covered access to
the national forests in Colorado. 2 3 Thus, the final legislation
contained no provisions with regard to access to inholdings.
According to Professor Brudney, the reliability of the Confer-
ence Report in this instance stems from the fact that there was a
shared understanding reached by Congress as a whole. 224 He ex-
plains that the Senate changed its position only because its desig-
nated representatives, the conferees, officially advised the Senate
that this Congress had already conferred such access in the
Alaska Lands Act.225 Professor Brudney concludes that by ac-
219. 16 U.S.C. § 3170 (1994).
220. See Alaska Act § 1323(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3210(1) (1988); see also
Montana Wilderness Ass'n. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951 (9th
Cir.1988) (finding ambiguity in both the text and the legislative history
regarding the application outside of Alaska of the access provisions of
the Alaska Lands Act, but determining that the text is most sensibly
read to favor "Alaska-only" coverage and that the legislative history fails
to overcome that reading).
221. Pub. L. No. 96-560, 94 Stat. 3265 (1980) (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 192b-9, 1131-1133) [hereinafter the "Colorado Act"].
222. Compare H.R. 5487 as passed by the House, 125 CONG. REC.
35,133-34 (1979) (no provision on access), with H.R. 5487 as passed by
the Senate, 126 CONG. REc. 27,280, 27,282 (1980) (§ 7 covers access).
223. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1521 (1980), reprinted in 126 CONG.
REc. 31,858, 31,864 (1980).
224. See Brudney, supra note 20, at 74.
225. See id. at 74.
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cepting the House version on access, and receding from the Sen-
ate version, for the reasons explained in the conference report
and reiterated on the Senate and House floors,2216 Congress as a
whole adopted the understanding that the previously-enacted
Alaska Lands Act conferred a nationwide right of access. 227
Professor Brudney's assessment that this was a valid use of leg-
islative history is easily contradicted. If Congress believed that the
Alaska Widerness Act covered all inholdings in national forest ar-
eas, Congress may explain this interpretation in that legislative
enactment, but not in subsequent reports. Here, the court clearly
used legislative history where it was unnecessary. As observed
above, the pertinent statutory text begins: "Notwithstanding any
other provisions of this Act or other law, in any case in which
State owned or privately owned land .... .228 This section of
the statute clearly pertains to this act and other laws. It provides
an exception that will apply in any case where this situation
arises. Courts should not use legislative history to validate their
opinions when unnecessary. This is especially true here, where
the statutory text was anything but ambiguous.
B. Additional Considerations
Referral to a conference committee is a critical stage in shap-
ing legislation. Here, a bill takes on its final form,2 29 as differ-
226. See 126 CONG. REc. 32,403 (1980) (statement of Sen. Hart)
("The Conference Committee did not accept the Senate bill's provision
on access to inholdings in Colorado wilderness areas, because Congress
has recently enacted -as part of the Alaska lands bill -a similar provi-
sion to apply to access to inholdings in all public lands."); id. at 32,405
(statement of Sen. Armstrong) ("Access to privately owned inholdings
. . . is especially important today[, and Senate access language] has
been dropped from this final legislation only because even more com-
prehensive language is included in the Alaska Lands legislation . . .");
id. at 32,408 (printed comparison of House, Senate, and conference
versions); see also id. at 31,882 (statement of Rep. Johnson) (inserting a
"factsheet" into the record which states that the relevant access provi-
sions are in the "Alaska Lands Bill").
227. See Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 655 F.2d 951 (withdrawing an
earlier decision on the basis of the new statute and in particular its leg-
islative history).
228. 16 U.S.C. § 3170 (1994).
229. The conference report represents the final form of legislation
because of the congressional practice that reports be adopted or re-
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ences between the House and Senate versions of the bill are rec-
onciled. Like Committee Reports, Conference Reports contain
both the legislative text and explanatory language. The explana-
tory language details whether the conference committee has
adopted the House or Senate language, and often explains its
meaning. It often duplicates the language from the House and
Senate reports. When a conference report reaches the floor of
each chamber, only the legislative text is considered for a vote.
Courts tend to use conference reports in much the same way
that they use Committee Reports. Judges look to the explana-
tions provided in the section-by-section analysis to determine in-
tent behind particular statutory provisions. Judge Wiggins be-
lieves that conference reports are one of the better sources of
legislative intent, but still offers some warning: "Conference re-
ports are marginally different because they tend to speak for the
[legislative] body, but, nevertheless, they are not truly reliable." 230
Conference Reports are frequently enigmas. In many cases, the
analysis fails to explain adequately the reasons why one chamber
has acceded to the text of the other's bill.231
Additionally, Conference Reports may provide "explanations of
the legislation that are not corroborated by any other record of
the process. ' 232 This results because the explanations may be dif-
ferent from those that were offered at the subcommittee and
committee levels. Judges need also remember that the five dele-
gates may be named to conference committees, while they are
not permitted to vote on the House floor.233
Finally, the conference report may be very different from the
bills that originally passed on the floor of either chamber. This
scenario is particularly likely when the Democratic Party controls
one chamber and the Republican Party the other.
jected as a whole without amendment. See CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRES-
SIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 818 (1989).
230. Letter from Judge Wiggins, supra note 4, at 2.
231. See Patricia M. Wald, Some-Observations On The Use Of Legisla-
tive History In The 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. Riv. 195, 201
(1983).
232. Id. at 201.
233. C-SPAN Networks Home Page, supra note 217.
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CONCLUSION
The legislative history of [the statutes] is ambiguous . . . . Be-
cause of this ambiguity it is clear that we must look to the stat-
utes themselves to find the legislative intent.234
Thurgood Marshall
While use of legislative history by courts may provide certain
benefits, these are marginal when weighed against the potential
for improper use.235 The great attraction of legislative history is
that it provides clues when other avenues fail. 236 The problem is
that legislative history has the potential to override or at least
compromise the statute itself.237
"Legislative history . . . is unlikely to come to the attention of
anyone not present in the room where it was made, until re-
searchers come upon it years later while looking for justifications
for interpreting the law to their liking."238 Courts should resist
the temptation to use legislative history as an interpretive aid.
The preceding environmental examples have shown that any use
of legislative history is fraught with peril. In short, courts may
use legislative history to support the rationale of a decision at
the expense of remaining true to the enacted text of legislation.
By applying only the enacted text, judges will be more truthful
to the American legislative process.
234. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
412 n.29 (1971).
235. Starr, supra note 49, at 379.
236. Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 61.
237. Starr, supra note 49, at 375.
238. Slawson, supra note 4, at 408.
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